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Introduction 
On a recent day, I used my credit cards in connection with a number of 
minor transactions. I made eight purchases, and I paid two credit card bills. I 
also discarded (without opening) three solicitations for new cards, balance 
transfer programs, or other similar offers to extend credit via a credit card. 
Statistics suggest that I am not atypical. U.S. consumers last year used credit 
cards in about 100 purchasing transactions per capita, with an average value 
of about $70. At the end of the year, Americans owed nearly $500 billion 
dollars, in the range of $1,800 for every man, woman, and child in the popu-
lation.1 Although the individual credit card transaction is small and routine, 
the transactions collectively have a significant effect on the overall stability 
of many American families, leading to a rise in consumer borrowing and an 
                                                                                                                      
 * Ben H. & Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law, Co-Director, Cen-
ter for Law, Business & Economics, University of Texas School of Law. B.A. 1982, Rice; J.D. 1985, 
University of Texas. —Ed. I thank Oren Bar Gill and participants at the University of Michigan 
“Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium for comments on an earlier version. I 
also acknowledge the continuing generous support of the Marlow Preston Fund at the University of 
Texas School of Law. 
 1. See The Nilson Report No. 828, at 9 (Feb. 2005). 
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increase in bankruptcy filing rates.2 The crux of the borrowing problem is 
the relationship between the cardholder and the issuer, which the law rele-
gates almost entirely to the private contractual relationships between those 
groups. Yet the existing literature has done little to assess the unique con-
tracting problems that those transactions present. 
That is not to say that scholars have overlooked credit cards. On the con-
trary, some scholars have noticed the lengthy fine-print agreements that 
issuers tender to their cardholders. Thus, credit cards have become a com-
mon topic in the boilerplate literature that culminates in the symposium for 
which this Article is prepared.3 The branch of that literature focused on con-
sumer contracts explores the extent to which voluminous terms in adhesion 
contracts become enforceable without the type of voluntary and informed 
assent on which the paradigm of contract law rests.4 At the same time, other 
scholars have become increasingly concerned about the likelihood that cog-
nitive and behavioral limitations restrict the ability of consumers to evaluate 
borrowing transactions effectively.5 
Credit card contracts directly implicate both of those literatures because 
the contracts are complex both in their literal form and in their economic 
substance. Two features of the context make credit card contracting more 
problematic than other consumer credit transactions. The first—suggested 
by the description of my account activity—is that credit cards have their 
effect in a large number of small transactions, each of which is so insignifi-
cant as to make careful consideration and calculating reflection impractical. 
Second, and more fundamentally, the transactions occur over an extended 
period, during which the business conditions that confront the issuer are 
likely to change. What that means is that the terms on which the issuer ex-
tends credit and seeks repayment will need to change over time. Because it 
is not cost-effective to engage in a separate contracting ritual for each pur-
chase, the result in practice is a set of terms that are defined by the issuer 
and changed with surprising frequency (often without meaningful notice to 
the user). To understand the difference, consider a home mortgage transac-
tion. If a consumer makes a mistake in a home mortgage transaction, the 
                                                                                                                      
 2. See Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Pay-
ment Card Markets Around the World chs. 4–5 (forthcoming 2006). 
 3. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. 
Rev. 679, 716–17; James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 Wayne L. Rev. 1693, 1700–01 (2000). 
 4. See Gillette, supra note 3, at 688; Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-
Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002).  
 5. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1373 (2004); Susan Block-
Lieb & Edward Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behaviorism, and the Mis-
guided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=786427; Ron Harris & Adu Einat Albin, Bankruptcy Policy in Light of 
Persuasion in Credit Advertisement, 7 J. Theoretical Inquiries in L. (forthcoming 2006); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: A Consumer’s Guide, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=772186; Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking & The Lim-
its of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending (Loyola-LA Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2005-14, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=748286. 
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consumer does so when she signs the documents, a point on which all of the 
financial considerations of the relation turn. 
A striking aspect of credit card contracts, however, is the comparative 
lack of regulation. Other similarly important consumer financial transac-
tions—like the home mortgage transaction and even the purchase of 
insurance—display a common historical pattern, in which regulators or in-
termediaries have stepped in to standardize terms in a way that focuses 
competition on the attributes of products that are most readily comprehensi-
ble to consumers. Those different regulatory approaches are provocative. 
The Essay begins in Part I with a summary of the problems presented by 
standardized terms in consumer transactions. Part II describes the contract-
ing practices that dominate the modern credit card industry. I argue that 
sophisticated card issuers have learned to exploit the boilerplate features of 
their agreements to produce a set of dynamic contracting obligations that 
even sophisticated cardholders could not understand. Finally, Part III ana-
lyzes several potential responses. First, I briefly explain my thoughts on 
several proposals mentioned in the literature. In general, those proposals are 
designed to improve consumer decisionmaking without limiting consumer 
choice. I generally conclude that those proposals are not likely to be effec-
tive. Then, I discuss choice-limiting responses that have been used 
effectively in other consumer finance contexts. I argue in favor of prohibit-
ing terms that alter the consequences of borrowing after the fact. Those 
terms make it very difficult for consumers to take account of the borrowing 
costs at the time of their purchasing and borrowing decisions. More broadly, 
I propose a centrally promulgated set of standardized terms that would leave 
businesses free to compete on the key financial terms that consumers are 
most likely to understand. 
I. Problems with Boilerplate 
Standardized contracts challenge the notion of informed consent upon 
which a market economy depends. Yet all seem to agree that they are inevi-
table, because of the lower transaction costs associated with drafting, 
bargaining, and allocating risks in a uniform way6 and because standardized 
contracts allow large organizations to control the contracts to which their 
agents bind them.7 
I begin by detailing a familiar litany of problems attributed to standardized 
contracts. Because those problems rest on debatable empirical or experimental 
premises, it is difficult to generalize about their effect on actual contracting 
                                                                                                                      
 6. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and 
Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 50–51 (1993); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An 
Essay In Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1174 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Con-
tracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 531 (1971). 
 7. See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131, 144 (1970); Stewart 
Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of 
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051, 1058–60 (1966); Rakoff, supra note 6, at 
1220–25. 
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practices. Nevertheless, most would agree that some of these problems are 
likely to affect some people at least some of the time. 
A. Assent 
Some of the most prominent questions in recent case law relate to the 
contracting process, with a general focus on the robustness of the con-
sumer’s assent. With standardized contracts, it often is hard to know which 
documents compose the contract or when the contract is formed. A written 
contract might refer to or incorporate other policies that may or may not be 
presented at the same time,8 but are likely to have been written by a different 
person at a different time. The terms might be presented in such a way that 
the consumer does not necessarily have to see them to enter the contract. For 
example, with the so-called browsewrap contracts that are used for website 
terms of use, a website user might be held to accept the terms by using the 
site even if the user does not actually locate and read the terms.9 There is a 
similar problem with terms presented by hyperlink, or perhaps in a scrolla-
ble screen or pop-up screen.10 Another possibility is that the terms are 
presented after the consumer has invested time or money in the transaction,11 
as is often the case with “pay-now terms-later” contracts that are common 
for insurance policies,12 tickets,13 and packaged consumer products.14 
                                                                                                                      
 8. An obvious example is the airline ticket, which might incorporate by reference provisions 
on limitation on liability, claim restrictions, rights of the carrier to change terms, rules about reserva-
tions, and covenants regarding the air carrier’s schedule. The full text of the terms must be available at 
the airport and city ticket office of the airline, and provided by mail or other delivery service. See 49 
U.S.C. § 41707 (2000); 14 C.F.R. § 253.5 (2005). 
 9. Consider the website for Amazon.com. Scrolling to the bottom of the entry screen, you see 
hyperlinks for “Conditions of Use” (a 70-paragraph, 2400-word document) and “Privacy Notice” (a 5-
paragraph, 2400-word document). Although those policies purport to bind anyone who visits the site, 
someone who orders a product will eventually come to a “Place Order” screen that states that “[b]y 
placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com’s privacy notice and conditions of use.” The contract of 
purchase is not complete until Amazon.com sends an e-mail verifying shipment. 
 10. E.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., No. 5-03-0643, 2005 WL 1968774 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 12, 
2005). 
 11. Credit card account agreements raise this concern to the extent that consumers cannot 
choose an issuer based on the issuer’s card agreement without investing the time to open an account. If 
those agreements were readily available over the Internet (something I advocate below), this might 
change, because cardholders would be better able to select credit card issuers based on comparing 
information available to them on the Internet. Of course, credit card agreements then might raise the 
other presentation problems that presently plague e-commerce transactions. 
 12. See Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198 
(1917) (noting that policies are often delivered after the customer has spent time to complete and file an 
application); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law 
by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21, 39 (1984) (same). 
 13. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(decrying the Court’s enforcement of exculpatory boilerplate language in a cruise ticket provided after 
the ticket was purchased, at which point the average passenger would accept the risk of injury rather 
than risk cancelling a planned vacation at the last minute). 
 14. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998) (computer equipment 
shipped with terms in box, at which point customer has incurred shipping costs and search costs); 
Rogers v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 99,991, 2005 WL 1519233 (Okla. June 28, 2005) (same). 
MANN FINAL.DOC 2/17/2006 8:42 AM 
March 2006] “Contracting” for Credit 903 
 
Finally, and of particular import for my project, the contract may be sub-
ject to unilateral modification by the drafter. Even where bilateral 
modification is required due to regulatory constraint or the drafter’s failure 
to reserve the unfettered right to amend, acceptance may be established by 
notice and continued performance.15 For continuing contracts, the notion of 
assent can be illusory. If the notice is not readable or is presented in a way 
that does not reach the consumer in an effective way, the consumer might 
not be aware of the modified terms. Similarly, even a consumer that reads 
the notice might be unable or disinclined to comply with an available opt-
out right. 
B. Readability 
A second set of concerns, assuming that the consumer in fact has seen 
the relevant documents, falls under the heading of readability. Is the font 
size too small? Is the agreement too long? Is it written in a language that the 
consumer can understand? Does it use jargon that obscures the plain mean-
ing of the words? Does the lack of tailoring to the transaction mean that 
large parts of the agreement do not apply? Does the agreement fit the actual 
transaction? 
The severity of readability problems depends on the nature of the trans-
action. The example often used to illustrate this point is the rental car 
contract. Consider the eight-page, foldout rental car agreement, with very 
small print and loaded with complex terminology, many of the terms of 
which would apply only to subsets of customers selecting particular service 
packages. This document is likely to be functionally unreadable, especially 
when it is presented for the first time at the counter, to a customer who has 
just completed a lengthy plane flight, perhaps accompanied by a number of 
small children, often late at night, and generally with numerous other people 
waiting in line in the same tiny office space. Aside from the circumstances 
of presentation, the reality is that the typical consumer contract requires a 
level of literacy and reading comprehension that is far beyond the grasp of 
the normal American.16 
Yet, would it be more readable if it were twelve pages of larger print or if 
it were sixteen pages of twelve-point type with clearer definitions? Would it 
make more sense if the counterperson had a higher level of education or train-
ing and were able to choose one of several different contracts that more 
accurately described the circumstances of the transaction? As Macaulay 
teaches us, a decision to enforce such contracts as written cannot rest on the 
idea that a man is bound to a written contract because he has chosen to accept 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that there was accep-
tance of contract with long distance carrier established by customer’s continued use of services after 
receiving customer agreement). 
 16. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 Stan. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 233, 235–41 (2002) (discussing incomprehensibility of financial disclosures). 
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its terms.17 Yet, if we would not enforce a contract written in lemon juice 
(legible to the sophisticate with a candle),18 where do we draw the line to 
permit enforcement of a contract where the type is legible? Is six-point type 
big enough? What about three-point type? Surely, the answer must have 
something to do with the substance of the form and the business conditions 
that motivate the way in which it is presented. 
Readability problems are not traditionally within the purview of the ba-
sic doctrinal tools of contract law, except to the extent that they render the 
contract unconscionable.19 Rather, responses have come from a variety of ad 
hoc quasi-regulatory consumer protection initiatives. For example, font-size 
requirements apply in certain types of transactions.20 A number of states 
have plain-language initiatives that require approval of forms by some cen-
tralized agency.21 In addition, there are often requirements that certain types 
of contracts be written in the language in which the transaction proceeded.22 
Only occasionally is there any comprehensive effort to respond to readabil-
ity concerns.23 
C. Fragmentary Contracts 
Another basic aspect of the standardized form is that the written docu-
ment need not contain all, or even most of, the terms of the transaction. 
Thus, in many of the most common examples of standardized terms, the 
document captures only a few of the relevant terms. For example, an event 
ticket might include only the date and time of the event and (on the back in 
smaller type) a detailed exculpatory clause protecting the exhibitor. A war-
ranty typically will describe the product features (and perhaps what the 
manufacturer does not promise in regards to the product) but omit the terms 
of the sales transaction. Similarly, a typical sales receipt might note the date 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1051, 1080–81. Rakoff makes the same point: “The tradi-
tional treatment requires that adherents to form contracts be treated as if they had read and 
understood the document presented to them, even if that conclusion is false and known by the other 
party to be so.” Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1187. 
 18. The example is Macaulay’s. Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1056. 
 19. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the Court’s enforcement of choice-of-forum clause in the fine print on the back of a 
ticket that only the “most meticulous passenger” would have seen). 
 20. E.g., 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (2005) (holder-in-due-course notice in consumer credit trans-
actions). 
 21. See 7 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 1.1201–1.1247 (2005) (“Plain Language Contract Provi-
sions” for Texas consumer credit transactions); Tex. Fin. Code § 341.502 (2004) (requiring 
specified types of consumer loans, “whether in English or Spanish, [to] be written in plain language 
designed to be easily understood by the average consumer” and requiring creditors to use either 
administratively drafted models or contracts previously approved by the finance commission); 
White & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 260. 
 22. See, e.g., 7 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.1(c)(5) (2005) (requiring Spanish translation of home 
loan notices “if the transaction is conducted primarily in Spanish”). 
 23. See N.J. Law Revision Comm’n, Final Report Relating to Standard Form Con-
tracts (1998), available at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/rpts/contract.pdf. 
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and time of the transaction and the price and tax paid, but omit any discus-
sion of the return policy. 
Fragmentation often occurs in areas in which the law might require a 
specific term to be included in a contract. Thus, for example, we might see a 
fine-print document that includes little more than rules purporting to limit 
the consumer’s right to sue, either substantively (through disclaimers of 
warranties) or procedurally (through choice-of-law, choice-of-forum, or ar-
bitration provisions).24 Still, fragmentation occurs even in lengthy 
boilerplate agreements. For example, consider a case in which the drafter 
might benefit from including some terms in writing, such as an arbitration 
clause or a choice-of-forum clause. If the drafter has little incentive to de-
fine other relevant terms in writing, even a lengthy standardized agreement 
might not memorialize all of the terms of the transaction.25 
D. Choice 
The preceding sections deal with how readily the consumer can learn the 
terms of the arrangement before the consumer chooses to enter a transaction 
with the drafter. From an economic perspective, it is that point—the moment 
of choice—that is significant. We value contracts in a free market economy 
largely because they facilitate decentralized and informed decisionmaking 
about the allocation of resources in the economy.26 However, that judgment 
only makes sense when the parties not only are aware of the risks and op-
portunities of their transactions, but also evaluate those risks in a rational 
way in making the choice to transact.27 
In the world of standardized terms and contracts, the range of choice is 
quite narrow. Negotiation is typically not an option. The consumer’s only 
substantial options are to accept the terms presented, continue shopping for 
other potential providers, or abandon the purchase altogether. If the docu-
ment is likely to be hard to read and even harder to revise, a rational 
consumer might not expend the effort to review the terms.28 Likewise, the 
consumer’s willingness to read the document certainly will be affected by 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2005) (enforcing arbitration 
provision incorporated by reference in language affixed to french-fry carton); see also John J.A. 
Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 Seton Hall Legis. J. 285, 292 (2000) 
(presenting results of empirical study finding that “[m]ost short contracts were printed on a written 
receipt and addressed two issues: scope of warranty and limitation of liability”). 
 25. Thus, in the credit card context, the issuer has little incentive to explain the limited im-
plications of paying an “annual” fee or obtaining a card with an expiration date. 
 26. See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1058. 
 27. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1471 (1998). 
 28. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer 
Payments, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 63 (1987); Gillette, supra note 3; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rational-
ity, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (2003); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt. b (1979) (“A party who makes regular use of a 
standardized form of agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to 
read the standard terms.”). 
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the social setting in which it is proffered—something that often is entirely 
within the control of the merchant.29 
In the case in which the consumer does read the document, attention is 
likely to focus on a few of the more significant terms rather than the document 
as a whole.30 If much of the document addresses legal risks and conditions that 
are not within the everyday experience of the typical consumer, the consumer 
might err in assessing the likelihood that those conditions will occur. The con-
sumer might not weigh the severity of the ensuing consequences accurately.31 
Moreover, the consumer’s own preferences may shift over time. Finally, con-
sumers may have bounded willpower, meaning that they may take actions that 
conflict with their own long-term interest.32 
The significance of those defects is open to debate. For example, in mar-
kets in which segmentation is difficult and in which errors are random, a 
relatively small number of heroically rational customers might drive contract-
ing markets to competitive terms.33 In other markets, in which merchants 
easily can segment their customers, or in which those that err in assessing risk 
will do so in a predictable and systematic way, these defects may cause con-
sumers in the market to make choices that are systematically suboptimal.34 
II. Credit Card Account Agreements 
A. Context 
The first point to make about the issuer–cardholder relationship is that it 
begins in a way that satisfies traditional doctrinal concerns about assent. The 
card agreement is typically the product of a solicitation that contains the 
terms expected to matter most to the cardholder and on which the card is-
suer competes. Issuers sent more than five billion direct mail solicitations in 
2004, for an average of more than five offers per month to more than sev-
enty percent of U.S. households.35 Although the response rate typically is 
                                                                                                                      
 29. See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1061. 
 30. I amplify this point below, discussing literature that emphasizes the limited number of 
attributes (typically no more than 3–5) that a typical individual can compare in making market 
choices. 
 31. This could be true because of simple (and presumably random) error, or because of a 
systematic bias related to optimism or availability. 
 32. The most obvious example here is hyperbolic discounting (which I discuss in more detail 
below). 
 33. See Gillette, supra note 3, at 691–93; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Infor-
mation in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. 
Rev. 1387 (1983). 
 34. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for 
Enterprise Liability, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 772–79 (1993); Gillette, supra note 3, at 691–93; Jon 
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for 
Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129, 154–58 (1990); see also Rakoff, supra note 6, at 
1231 (arguing that results of competition say nothing about consumer preferences when contracts 
are not in fact understood by consumers). 
 35. Federal Reserve System, Board of Governors, The Profitability of Credit Card 
Operations of Depositary Institutions 5 (2005) [hereinafter Federal Reserve, 2005 Report], 
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quite low,36 tens of millions responded last year by submitting a credit card 
application. The solicitation is followed by the submission of an application 
by a cardholder, which is followed upon acceptance by the issuance of a 
card and a cardholder agreement.37 Typically, that process is followed by the 
requirement that the card be validated over the telephone—the telephone 
validation occurs after the cardholder has received the agreement and before 
the card is used. Thus, to generalize, the contracting process is still primarily 
paper-based, and the assent is more robust than in the electronic contracting 
practices challenged so often in recent litigation. 
It is less clear, however, that a cardholder of reasonable care and intellec-
tual capability can be expected to read or understand the agreement. Credit 
card contracts share many of the features of other standardized agreements. 
Thus, they are relatively complex. A typical credit card agreement, for exam-
ple, might have about eight single-spaced pages of small (seven-point) type, 
including about eighty separately numbered provisions. Many of the terms in 
the agreement are comprehensible only for cardholders with specialized 
knowledge. For example, financial terms such as “annual percentage rate” or 
“APR” assume proficiency with interest calculations, and legal terms such as 
arbitration, forum, and default assume an advanced understanding of the legal 
process. Further, a single account may have multiple APRs that apply to dif-
ferent types of credit extensions or different periods.  
The likelihood that the cardholder will have cards from multiple issuers 
only exacerbates the complexity of the relationships. Although most con-
sumers have only one deposit account, the typical cardholder, and especially 
the frequent borrower, is likely to have several different cardholder agree-
ments.38 They also are likely to contain choice-of-law provisions that select 
the laws of different states. Moreover, unlike the issuers of home mort-
gages39 or insurance policies,40 to take the closest parallels, each credit card 
                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2005/ccprofit.pdf (dis-
cussing industry study that shows that an estimated 5.23 billion direct mail solicitations were sent by 
issuers during 2004, up 22% from 4.29 billion in 2003, with 71% of U.S. households receiving an 
average of 5.7 offers per month). 
 36. Id. (noting that the response rate on credit card solicitations in 2004 was estimated to be 
0.4 %). 
 37. I am not aware of any issuers that make their standard forms available to consumers 
either online or with solicitation materials so that consumers can compare terms before submitting 
an application.  
 38. As of the end of 2004, there were more than two credit card accounts for every man, 
woman, and child in the United States, including about 430 million credit card accounts from Visa 
and MasterCard, The Nilson Report, No. 828, at 6 (Feb. 2005), 50 million from Discover, The 
Nilson Report, No. 831, at 9 (Apr. 2005), 115 million from in-house store card programs, The 
Nilson Report, No. 838, at 8 (July 2005), and 30 million from American Express, The Nilson 
Report, No. 826, at 7 (Jan. 2005). 
 39. See Arthur R. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W. New 
Eng. L. Rev. 271, 284–85 (2002) (discussing the development of the standard residential real estate 
mortgage by the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)); Ronald J. Mann, Searching 
for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 951, 971 (1997) (same). 
 40. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation 32 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“[S]tandardization in insurance . . . involves . . . an offer of the same policy, to all customers, by all 
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issuer is likely to use a standardized agreement that is in form (if not sub-
stance) different in several respects from the forms of other major issuers. 
Thus, the cardholder who wants to maintain a comprehensive understanding 
of the status of cardholder agreements will need to understand the relevant 
legal rules in the applicable states, will need to study a different agreement 
for each card, and will need to remember as cards are pulled from the wallet 
which agreement corresponds to each card. This in a world in which few 
consumers are likely even to notice, much less retain, the relevant agree-
ments as they arrive in their stack of daily junk mail. 
Another point is that it is not always easy for a layperson to determine 
which papers constitute the agreement for each card. The current Bank of 
America agreement, for example, consists of a separately printed eight-page 
standardized form, together with a set of “Additional Disclosures” that ap-
pear in the billing statement at the bottom of a sheet labeled “Important 
Summary of Changes to Your Account.” The cardholder who skips the 
summary after reading the agreement would fail to notice such additional 
terms as a default provision that permits Bank of America to impose a pen-
alty APR of about ten percent per annum more than the standard APR. 
Finally, a cardholder also would need to monitor the frequent amend-
ments of each of the agreements. It is typical for major issuers to amend 
their agreements in important respects with remarkable frequency. Amend-
ments are not the typical bargained-for modifications of contract theory. 
Rather, the typical agreement reserves to the issuer the right to amend the 
agreement at any time, with the issuer promising at best that it will provide 
notice of the amendments. When it does provide notice, the notice typically 
is in the form of a new agreement included in a billing statement together 
with a variety of other promotional materials. The cardholder who uses a 
rule of thumb41 to discard all marketing information that comes with bills is 
likely to fail to notice such amendments.42 
To be sure, issuers obtain consent before applying some new financial 
terms, but consent is inferred from such actions as continuing to use the card 
after notice of the amendment or failure to close the account and send a 
prompt written objection to the amendment.43 Importantly, amendments 
                                                                                                                      
companies. Competition in insurance markets, therefore, often tends to be over price, quality of 
service, or reliability, but rarely over the terms of coverage itself.”). 
 41. See Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on 
the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
329 (1986) (discussing the prevalence of such rules as techniques for managing complex choices). 
 42. As a matter of traditional contract doctrine, it is not plain that such amendments are 
enforceable. See Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998) (declining to en-
force “bill-stuffer” amendment that added arbitration term even though cardholder did not close or 
stop using account upon receipt of amendment with bill). However, several key states explicitly 
permit amendments based on notices enclosed with billing statements followed by subsequent card 
use. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 952 (2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 7-5-4(c) (2004); see also Strand v. 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 2005) (holding that bill-stuffer amendment waiving 
the right to file a class action was procedurally unconscionable, but enforceable because the term 
was not substantively unconscionable). 
 43. Issuers have used a variety of different opt-out provisions in “change in terms” clauses. 
Some require that a consumer opt out of the modified terms in ways that might not be feasible or 
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typically apply to funds already borrowed. For example, a change in the 
terms of default44 might substantially increase the interest rate the cardholder 
will pay on balances outstanding at the time of the amendment. 
In evaluating the contracting problems that the card presents, it is impor-
tant to remember the unusual nature of the reciprocal obligations on which 
the relationship rests. On the cardholder’s side, there is no commitment to 
use the card. Moreover, even if the card is used, timely payments often ob-
viate any obligation to pay interest or fees. Nor is the lack of a commitment 
illusory. In many (perhaps most) cases, the cardholder can switch credit 
sources easily. Viewed on a purchase-by-purchase basis, the typical card-
holder makes a different decision for each transaction when deciding which 
card to present at the checkout counter. 
On the issuer’s side, there is a similar evanescence of obligation inherent 
in the business of card issuance. As with most lending transactions, the 
lender is not in any practical sense obligated to lend until the moment at 
which the lender actually extends funds to the borrower. Rather, the parties 
proceed on the useful rule of thumb that absent an unforeseen change of 
circumstances it normally will be profitable for the lender to extend the 
credit for which the lender has expended time and energy to structure a 
transaction. Issuers deal with the possibility of such changes by reserving 
the right to refuse to extend credit on a transaction-by-transaction basis.45 If 
this were not permitted, issuers would be deprived of the ability to terminate 
accounts based on deterioration of the borrower’s credit over time. It would 
also make it difficult to respond to concerns about unauthorized use. 
More broadly, because interest rates and the competitive landscape 
change rapidly, credit card issuers require a great deal of flexibility to oper-
ate. Forcing an issuing bank to adhere to credit terms in a dynamic 
economic environment would not promote an efficient credit relationship. 
                                                                                                                      
desirable for all accountholders. Those ways include notice and immediate repayment of the entire 
outstanding balance, see Shea v. Household Bank (SB), Nat’l Ass’n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (2003) 
(holding that failure to repay outstanding balance not sufficient “use” to support bilateral modifica-
tion), or notice and deferred repayment of the outstanding balance at a penalty rate, see Rossman v. 
Fleet Bank R.I. Nat’l Ass’n, 280 F.3d 384, 388, 398 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that interest rate would 
increase from 7.99% to 24.99% upon closure of account). Others more generously permit opt out 
based on notice and discontinuation of use of the card or, even easier, notice with the right to con-
tinue using the card under the current terms until the end of the membership year or expiration date 
on the card. 
 44. To give context, one major issuer recently amended its agreement to provide that it can 
charge its default rate to any cardholder who is late or overlimit twice in a single year. Thus, a card-
holder with a $12,000 annual limit that makes two $50 overlimit transactions on a single day might 
be exposed to a default rate on the existing $12,000 of debt, even if that type of conduct would not 
have been an event of default at the time the funds were borrowed. This could reflect, for example, a 
shift from a model in which issuers welcome overlimit transactions as an identifier of illiquid bor-
rowers likely to pay interest, to a model in which issuers rely on cognitive difficulties that 
cardholders face in tracking their outstanding balances to collect fees on accidental overlimit trans-
actions by liquid borrowers. 
 45. Some courts have rejected the argument that payment of an annual fee precludes the 
issuer from modifying or terminating the agreement for that period. E.g., Gaynoe v. First Union 
Direct Bank, No. 97 CVS 16536, 2001 WL 34000142, at *10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2001) (hold-
ing that annual fees are not fees paid for services to be performed over time, but rather in 
consideration of issuing a card). 
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That is not to say that lenders cannot commit at one time to provide credit at 
some specified future date. It is to say, however, that lenders typically 
charge for such a commitment and that the absence of a commitment (and 
related fee) from the credit card market should surprise nobody. Thus, mar-
ket conditions require that issuers retain some ability to modify the terms of 
their agreements.46 
As suggested above, the difficulty of obtaining individual consents from 
large numbers of cardholders has led issuers generally to reserve the right to 
change the terms of their agreements when cardholders use their cards after 
receiving notice of the change.47 In the context of the business model, how-
ever, that provision is less onerous than it might seem at first glance. Given 
the lack of obligation—on either side—it makes more sense to view each 
separate purchase transaction as a separate agreement between the card-
holder and card issuer that is completed when the card issuer agrees to 
extend credit for a particular transaction that the cardholder wishes to en-
ter.48 When the cardholder decides to borrow funds from the lender, it 
borrows them on the terms available from the issuer at that point, just as we 
purchase a CD from a bank at the interest rate available on the day we con-
tact the bank to purchase it. 
B. Ramifications 
The key question is whether consumers on the ground are making 
choices with sufficient care and rationality to drive the market to a competi-
tive and optimal set of products and prices. These are complex relationships. 
It is unlikely that the typical consumer will be able to evaluate all of the at-
tributes of the transaction that have economic significance. 
I draw here on a long-standing body of experimental literature indicating 
that the ability of a typical consumer to evaluate separate attributes declines 
rapidly after the number of relevant attributes exceeds three.49 Applied to 
this particular context, Jeffrey Davis has conducted an empirical study of 
                                                                                                                      
 46. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1–226.36, requires a credit card issuer to give fifteen 
days written notice of a change in terms if the term was required to be disclosed initially under 12 
C.F.R. § 226.6 or the required minimum payment is increased. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2005). The 
fifteen-day advance notice requirement does not apply if a rate or fee is increased due to the cus-
tomer’s default, and the notice requirement does not apply at all if the change involves late payment 
charges, over-the-limit charges or other specified occurrences. 
 47. See White, supra note 3, at 1700–01 (asserting that modification of credit card agree-
ments following notice and use is consistent with the objective theory of contracts and practical 
necessity). 
 48. See Garber v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (hold-
ing that a separate contract was created each time the card was used according to the terms of the 
cardholder agreement at the time of such use). 
 49. See James R. Bettman, An Information Processing Theory of Consumer Choice 
(1979); David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search 
and Disclosure, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 277, 296–97 (1986); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process 
and as Product of Thought, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 1, 13 (1978); see also Block-Lieb & Janger, supra 
note 5, § III(A)(1) (reviewing the literature). 
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consumer comprehension of consumer finance agreements,50 using an 
agreement much less complicated than a modern credit card agreement.51 
Davis found that most consumers that read the agreement could not under-
stand most of its terms. Davis’s findings emphasize in particular the 
difficulty that consumers face in understanding terms that involve complex 
concepts that are not common in daily experience.52 Although the study is 
relatively informal, its findings do dovetail with the reality of the modern 
credit card agreement. In particular, a consumer must account for costs and 
fees that differ from card to card and shift over time (often after the pur-
chase in question), as well as complex concepts of default and a litany of 
fees payable as a consequence of specified actions.53 In reality, we cannot 
think it likely that consumers understand most of the terms even when they 
do review the agreements. 
Rather, decision theory suggests, the rational approach for the typical 
cardholder will be to select a product based on a small number of price and 
service attributes that are of obvious relevance, recognizing that the remain-
ing terms of the agreement are nonnegotiable. For example, a consumer 
would be likely to select a bank based solely on the cost of writing checks, 
the minimum balance required to avoid a monthly fee, and the location and 
fees for using automated teller machines to withdraw cash. In the case of a 
credit card contract, empirical research suggests a typical consumer selects a 
card based on the brand, annual fee, grace period, affinity or rewards bene-
fits, and the stated interest rate if the consumer expects to pay interest in the 
immediate future.54 Because those terms are contained in the advertising 
materials, consumers in most cases are unlikely even to look at the contract. 
Thus, a consumer of typical decisionmaking capacity would not rationally 
consider the terms defining or explaining the consequences of late payment 
or excessive borrowing, even though they generate a substantial share of 
issuer revenue (in the form of fees and default APRs). If consumers do not 
consider those terms, there is a concern that issuers will not draft them in a 
competitive way.55 
                                                                                                                      
 50. Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Em-
pirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 Va. L. Rev. 841 (1977). 
 51. The agreement is set forth in an appendix to Davis’s article. Id. app. A at 908–11. It is 
perhaps one-quarter the length of a modern credit cardholder agreement. 
 52. See id. at 854–56. 
 53. See Philip Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 134–
35 (1962) (discussing some of the detailed legal acumen required for understanding consumer credit 
contracts). 
 54. Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, Relationships Among Information Search Activities 
When Shopping for a Credit Card, 34 J. Consumer Affairs 330 (2000) (documenting rarity with 
which consumers evaluate anything other than the most basic financial terms). 
 55. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 34, at 154–58 (discussing lack of competitive pressure 
on terms not examined by consumers); Korobkin, supra note 28 (explaining why—when contract 
terms are not within the limited number of attributes that consumers are expected to price—drafting 
parties will have an incentive to include terms that favor themselves regardless of whether the terms 
are efficient). 
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A second concern, one to which legal academics have paid considerably 
more attention, is the likelihood that consumers would not price the risks of 
card agreements accurately even if they did invest the time and attention 
necessary to understand and evaluate the relevant financial terms. Tom Jack-
son has suggested that systematic failures in the cognitive process cause 
individuals to underestimate the risks that their current consumption im-
poses on their future well-being.56 Building on that point, recent behavioral 
economics literature suggests that consumers give excessive weight to the 
conspicuous “up-front” aspects of a relationship and inadequate weight to 
less conspicuous “back-end” terms.57 
The pricing problem is associated with several related cognitive 
tendencies. One is a so-called “optimistic” bias, which leads people to 
underestimate the likelihood of adverse events—in this case, to 
underestimate both the likelihood that they would suffer financial distress 
and the costs that the distress would impose on them.58 Another is an 
“availability” bias, which leads people to overweigh the probability of 
common occurrences (which are readily available to their decisionmaking 
faculties) and underweigh the probability of uncommon occurrences. If 
financial distress is an uncommon event, that bias might cause consumers to 
underweigh the likelihood and consequences of financial distress.59 Another 
concern is hyperbolic discounting. Generally, this causes consumers to make 
intertemporal comparisons that are unstable over time—so that future 
behavior will be systematically inconsistent with present predictions of that 
behavior.60 In this context, it can lead to excessive borrowing.61 
                                                                                                                      
 56. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 
1393, 1410–14 (1985). 
 57. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and In-
formation Suppression in Competitive Markets (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=728545 (summariz-
ing literature). 
 58. See, e.g., James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Presenting Risk Informa-
tion, in W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat, Learning About Risk: Consumer and Worker 
Responses to Hazard Information 13, 17 (1987); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 654–58 
(1999); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality & 
Soc. Psychol. 806, 809–12 (1980). 
 59. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist 
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1, 40 (2004); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychol. 207, 208 
(1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 Sci. 1124 (1974); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and 
Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 991 (2005). 
 60. See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in Choice over Time 57, 
69 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Con-
tract Design and Self Control: Theory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. Econ. 353 (2004); Christine Jolls et 
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1539–40 (1998); David 
Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443 (1997). 
 61. Bar-Gill, supra note 5, at 1375–76; DellaVigna & Malmendier, supra note 60. 
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The concerns those tendencies justify are exacerbated if card issuers are 
in a position to exploit them.62 David Laibson and his co-author have identi-
fied a strategy that they call “shrouding,” in which merchants identify a 
myopic or satisficing class of customers and exploit the lack of rationality 
by systematically backloading the less attractive terms into a less prominent 
time and place in the relationship.63 Stewart Macaulay’s work on credit cards 
before the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) suggests that card issuers used 
similar techniques to make cardholders responsible for the losses from sto-
len cards. At that time, the strategy was to omit any language about lost 
cards from the application and then include a fine-print clause on the back 
of the card indicating that the cardholder was responsible for all transactions 
in which the card was presented (even if the transaction was conducted by a 
thief with a stolen card).64 Similarly, Oren Bar-Gill’s article on credit card 
contracting argues specifically that credit card companies use pricing fea-
tures such as teaser rates to take advantage of a quasi-rationally elevated 
concern for near-term costs as opposed to long-term costs for market prod-
ucts that depend on systematic underestimation of borrowing costs.65 
Those strategies are less successful where competition can “debias” 
markets. Consider, for example, how the entry of Netflix has trumped the 
earlier shrouding strategy on which Blockbuster relied.66 Generally, Block-
buster’s profit model in the early years of this decade coupled low rental 
fees with high late fees. If consumers underestimated the amount of late fees 
or the probability that they would pay them, they would underestimate the 
costs of renting from Blockbuster. By designing a product that exploited that 
error, Blockbuster increased its short-term profits. Netflix responded with a 
two-pronged approach: a pricing model that does not involve late fees and 
an education strategy designed to create an aversion to late fees. It is too 
soon to tell whether the Netflix approach will result in a long-term market 
position for Netflix,67 but it did disrupt Blockbuster’s profit model. 
                                                                                                                      
 62. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 58; Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1231 (noting that “intense 
competition will, if anything, make the situation worse, for it tends toward degradation of any [con-
sumer]-protective provisions of the contract”). 
 63. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 57 (presenting model that explains why firms shroud 
the negative attributes of their products, particularly high prices for complementary add-ons, and 
shows why competition will not induce firms to reveal information that would improve market 
efficiency). 
 64. Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1069–74. 
 65. See Bar-Gill, supra note 5; see also Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse Selection in the 
Credit Card Market (June 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Michigan Law Review). The 
suspicion that credit card issuers try to hide the terms that are harmful to consumers is not a new 
one. Macaulay’s work on credit cards before the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1642 
(West 2004), suggests that card issuers used similar techniques to make cardholders responsible for 
the losses from stolen cards. Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1069–74. 
 66. See David Leonhardt, All Consuming; Why That Doggie in the Window Costs More Than 
You Think, N.Y. Times, May 16, 2005, at C5. 
 67. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 57 (pointing out that it is difficult for any single firm 
to capture the profits from debiasing consumers). 
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As the Blockbuster–Netflix example suggests, educating consumers of 
both front-end and back-end costs can disrupt a profit model that relies on 
back-end costs. In the credit card context, issuers at one time might have 
been vulnerable to sophisticated cardholders who avoid the payment of in-
terest and fees by using a card with no annual fee and making timely 
monthly payments.68 Thus, as the number of sophisticated users grew, it be-
came increasingly difficult for card issuers to profit by hiding expensive 
back-end interest payments. 
The complexity of the modern credit card transactional structure mini-
mizes the likelihood that issuers will be forced to use transparent pricing 
models without regulatory intervention. The Blockbuster–Netflix example 
describes a single market segment with a shrouding technique that was de-
stabilized when consumers were encouraged to develop accurate perceptions 
of their future behavior. Modern credit card issuers, however, have used at 
least two tactics to prevent increased customer sophistication from destabi-
lizing their profit models.69 
The first tactic has been to develop product features that segment the 
market into smaller niches. The discussion above describes a single credit-
card product, offered to all customers. That product was attractive to the 
sophisticated because it was free and to the unsophisticated because they 
failed to understand either the costs of the product or their likely use of it. 
Responding to the growth of card users that do not borrow, issuers in recent 
years have developed a number of different products that prevent increased 
sophistication. For example, the sophisticated cardholder who wishes not to 
pay interest and fees is likely to be attracted to an affinity or rewards card 
issued by MBNA. For that product, the cardholder is likely to pay an annual 
fee,70 which the sophisticated user will rationalize as costing less than the 
value of the rewards (frequent flyer miles or the like). There is every reason 
to expect that the cardholder’s calculation often will be incorrect.71 More-
over, those calculations accord no weight to the value of the information 
MBNA obtains from the relationship.72 Even if that calculation is correct, the 
new product certainly has made the relationship more profitable on a card-
holder-by-cardholder basis than it was in years past, when there might have 
been a direct cross-subsidization between convenience users and borrowers. 
                                                                                                                      
 68. See id. at 5 (noting that sophisticated credit card users take advantage of “free miles” and 
avoid interest rate charges and late payment fees). 
 69. See id. (noting that innovation creates new opportunities for shrouding and undermines 
the effects of education). 
 70. The card issuer also may receive a higher interchange fee for these cards, which might be 
passed back to consumers at the point of sale in the form of higher prices. 
 71. The emphasis here is on rationalization, not rational calculation. Macaulay’s early study 
compared contracts for gasoline cards (issued primarily to less wealthy individuals) and travel and 
entertainment (“T&E”) cards issued to more wealthy individuals. He provides some interesting 
empirical evidence suggesting that the wealthy are no more likely to “debias” than the impecuni-
ous—perhaps because their sense that their time is more valuable decreases the likelihood that they 
will pay attention to details of small transactions. See Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1086–1107. 
 72. MBNA’s annual reports explain in detail the valuable uses it makes of that information. 
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The concept of segmentation is not a new one. As Lizabeth Cohen ex-
plains in A Consumer’s Republic, the strategy of segmenting consumers into 
ever more finely delineated classes has been a dominant strategy for a half 
century. It was identified in the 1950s in academic writings by people like 
Wendell Smith and Pierre Martineau, and swiftly transformed the business 
models of all U.S. businesses aiming at consumers.73 
The second tactic is to take advantage of the fact that consumers are 
likely to have multiple account agreements, all of which are likely subject to 
frequent unilateral modifications, both of which work together to hinder 
consumer understanding. If each issuer has a different set of rules, and if the 
pitfalls hidden in the rules differ for each issuer and from time to time, only 
the most careful cardholder will avoid any level of interest or fees. The point 
of this tactic is that within each of the market segments described above, 
even for the cardholders that attempt to position themselves as non-
borrowing convenience users, it will require an increasing level of attention 
to detail to successfully avoid paying fees to the issuer. 
If I am right, those strategies make the card industry more resistant to 
debiasing than parallel industries. That leaves us with a basic policy ques-
tion: how to regulate a contracting market in which a seller faces a 
heterogeneous set of purchasers, some but not all of whom are sufficiently 
careful and sophisticated to respond rationally to the terms offered by the 
seller. As discussed above, we know that if purchasers are homogeneous in 
their preferences, a relatively small number of sophisticated customers can 
produce competition in the market that will drive the seller to offer an effi-
cient product. Alternatively, if purchasers are heterogeneous in their 
preferences but are always sophisticated, then each purchaser will respond 
rationally to the terms offered by the seller. We would expect this to be the 
case, for example, in relatively high-dollar markets. We are left here, how-
ever, with the case that falls between those simple cases: a market in which 
only some customers understand the offered terms, and in which the choices 
of those customers do not produce competition that alters the terms avail-
able to the other customers. The existing theoretical literature, I think it is 
fair to say, has not worked out how to analyze potential regulatory responses 
in that context. 
III. Responding to Problems with Credit Card Agreements 
If the allocation of risks in existing cardholder agreements is not the re-
sult of effective competition or rational choice by cardholders, the natural 
question is whether and, if so, how the law should respond. Lawrence 
Friedman describes a common pattern of consumer regulation. After an in-
dustry develops to a point where a stable set of products and transactions 
has developed, the typical response is for the legislature to step in and trans-
fer those areas “from the realm of abstract contract law” to the realm of 
                                                                                                                      
 73. See Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consump-
tion in Postwar America 292–309 (2003). 
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economic regulation.74 As Stewart Macaulay explains, we can view this as a 
process by which commercial areas “spin off” for special treatment.75 
For example, as the mail order industry grew in size, the FTC adopted a 
set of standardized contract terms, eliminating competition on terms that 
consumers are unlikely to notice. The FTC Mail Order Rule establishes a set 
of procedures that retailers must follow if they are unable to ship goods 
within the time they estimate at the time they take the order. If the delay is 
moderate, they must give the customer an opportunity to cancel the order. If 
the delay is extreme, they must cancel the order unless the customer explic-
itly consents to the extension.76 We can imagine that in the absence of such a 
rule, retailers might have different terms in their contracts to deal with the 
possibility of delayed shipments. We also can be sure that few consumers 
would examine and analyze those terms. Therefore, even if the FTC delay 
term is not optimal, it does serve to focus competition in that industry on the 
price, selection, and quality of delivered products, terms customers are most 
likely to notice. 
Viewing the regulatory framework within that paradigm, it is striking 
how little the existing law does to regulate the credit card agreement. Most 
of the rules that govern credit card transactions are found in the Truth in 
Lending Act (“TILA”) and Regulation Z.77 The legal regime defined by 
those rules is primarily a disclosure-based system,78 but it does impose sev-
eral substantive constraints on the practices of card issuers. Specifically, 
TILA prohibits banks from issuing unsolicited credit cards to consumers.79 
TILA also has several provisions relating to unauthorized use and merchant 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Lawrence Friedman, Contract Law in America 140–83 (1965). I write consciously 
in a line of recent scholarship that analyzes how responses to social problems that traditionally are 
characterized as “public” and “private” in fact are closely intertwined and interdependent. E.g., 
Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social 
Benefits in the United States (2002); David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: The Govern-
ment as Ultimate Risk Manager (2002). 
 75. Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1056. 
 76. FTC Mail or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 435 (2005). 
 77. Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 132, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1642 (West 2004); Regulation Z, 12 
C.F.R. §§ 225, 226 (2005). The Uniform Commercial Code does not cover payment cards. See 
U.C.C. § 4-104(a)(9) (2002) (“ ‘Item’ . . . does not include . . . a credit or debit card slip.”). But see 
Broadway Nat’l Bank v. Barton-Russell Corp., 585 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (reaching a 
contrary conclusion under pre-revision Article 4). Although some states have enacted statutes that 
govern certain aspects of the issuer/cardholder relationship, it seems fair to say that none of those 
statutes has any significant impact, largely because the National Bank Act would preempt any sub-
stantial regulation. See Mark Furletti, The Debate over the National Bank Act and the Preemption of 
State Efforts to Regulate Credit Cards, 77 Temp. L. Rev. 425 (2004). To the extent there is any 
substantive regulation by the states, it tends to be very specific statutes authorizing specific business 
practices, like the Delaware bill-stuffer statute discussed above. See supra note 42. 
 78. Regulation Z requires that a bank issuing a credit card provide the consumer a written 
disclosure that summarizes the applicable legal rules. Regulation Z, §§ 226.5, 226.6. Appendix G to 
Regulation Z contains model disclosures. Id. app. G. 
 79. TILA, § 1642; Regulation Z, § 226.12(a). 
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disputes that give consumers a right to cancel payment that is broader than 
the consumers’ rights in any of the competing payment systems.80 
Still, the existing framework assumes, at least if the card issuer makes 
the required disclosures, that cardholders are best situated to decide with 
which entities and on which terms to enter card agreements.81 That frame-
work reflects an almost complete acceptance of the concern that terms 
established by government fiat will be less flexible, less innovative, and less 
likely to allocate risks sensibly than the terms selected by parties to a freely 
negotiated commercial arrangement.82 
The question is whether there is some reason to think that credit card 
contracts are sufficiently afflicted by contracting inefficiencies or external-
ities to warrant spinning them off from the general hands-off realm of 
contract enforcement to the realm of interventionist social planning. On the 
first of the two points—whether market obstacles prevent efficient contract-
ing—the preceding section of this essay summarizes a number of reasons to 
think that the process by which cardholders enter into card agreements does 
not function well. On the second one, there also is good reason to think that 
the results of that process not only have adverse effects for the cardholders, 
but also impose costs on society more broadly. The concern is that the credit 
card is so easy to use that borrowers fail to give adequate attention to the 
financial distress attendant on their borrowings. Thus, in related work I 
show that increased credit card borrowing is uniquely associated with an 
increase in personal bankruptcy filings—even when we hold constant the 
total level of borrowing and account for general conditions in the economy.83 
Following on that point, the increased financial distress associated with ris-
ing card use can cause harms that the borrower might not adequately 
consider when the borrower makes contracting decisions.84 
Assuming that some form of economic regulation is called for, it is less 
clear precisely what type of intervention makes the most sense. If the exist-
ing literature makes anything clear, it is that a sensible intervention must pay 
attention to the situation on the ground, lest it end up doing more harm than 
                                                                                                                      
 80. TILA, §§ 1643, 1666, 1666i. Oddly enough, those provisions might be counterproduc-
tive if they encourage consumers to use credit cards instead of debit cards. 
 81. That is not to say that I think the existing disclosure regime is sensible, see White & 
Mansfield, supra note 16, at 260–62 (arguing that the disclosures are too complex to be comprehen-
sible to typical consumers), or that it could not be improved. I argue in related work that the existing 
disclosure regime should focus much more on disclosure at the point of purchase (where consump-
tion and borrowing decisions are made) than the existing regime. See Mann, supra note 2, ch. 13. 
One of the leading reasons for that recommendation is the view that a shift from credit card usage to 
debit card usage would decrease imprudent borrowing. 
 82. See Craswell, supra note 6, at 49–50 (explaining that problems in market competition for 
contract terms do not justify administrative promulgation of terms if the administrative terms will 
not be better than the market terms). 
 83. See Mann, supra note 2, chs. 4–5. 
 84. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 56, at 1419–22; Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare 
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the 
Freedom to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283 (1995). For a more detailed discussion, see Mann, 
supra note 2, ch. 4. 
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good.85 The biggest concern is that a regulatory intervention viewed as a 
minor and plainly benign intervention by regulators might in fact undermine 
the business models prevalent in the industry in ways that harm competition. 
That is a major problem in this context, because the credit card is an espe-
cially efficient payment and borrowing device.86 Working from that 
perspective, the remainder of this essay considers a series of possible re-
sponses. 
A. Running in Place 
To understand the feasibility and effectiveness of interventions in the 
credit card market, it is important to understand not only the contracting 
problems discussed above, but also some more general difficulties with con-
sumer behavior in that market. Generally, the borrowing problem associated 
with credit cards arises from two related consumer errors.87 The first is what 
I call the instrument-induced risk. This risk occurs when consumers use a 
credit card as a payment device and do not intend to borrow. Because some 
evidence suggests that the credit card encourages consumers to spend more 
than they otherwise would, and perhaps more than they can repay out of 
monthly incomes, credit card use can lead to unanticipated debt. The second 
is the convenience risk. Because the transaction costs of credit card lending 
are so low, borrowers are more likely to underestimate the risks associated 
with future revenue streams than they would be in another type of consumer 
credit transaction. Both of those risks arise against a trifurcated framework 
that makes the contracting decision less important to most consumers than 
the spending and borrowing decisions. Thus, both types of mistakes occur 
after the contracting decision has been made. Because existing analyses 
have failed to understand that trifurcated framework and its effect on con-
sumer decisionmaking, neither the current regulatory framework nor the 
leading proposals in the existing literature respond adequately. 
1. Invalidate Unconscionable Terms Ex Post 
For example, the simplest possibility is the response of the common law: 
ex post judicial invalidation of terms as unconscionable. There is nothing 
new about this idea, which dates (at least) to work by Friedrich Kessler in 
the early 1940s.88 A similar idea appears in section 211 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts. But several considerations limit the effectiveness of 
that doctrine as a general tool to police contracting problems. For example, 
judicial decisionmaking under a vague rubric of “unconscionability” often 
                                                                                                                      
 85. See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211 (2003); Macaulay, supra note 7.  
 86. See Mann, supra note 2, ch. 3. 
 87. I discuss these two classes or errors in more detail in id. pt. IV. 
 88. See Friedrich Kessler Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943). 
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leads to the disparate readjustment of terms in ways that the parties did not 
contemplate in their pricing decisions. Moreover, courts that apply such an 
approach with sufficient vigor to have a substantial effect on contracting 
practices are likely to do a poor job of sorting provisions that make eco-
nomic sense from those that reflect overreaching.89  
This is not to say that the unconscionability doctrine can serve no useful 
purpose. For example, the unconscionability doctrine might encourage busi-
nesses to think more carefully about the enforceability of the clauses that 
they write, leading them to use larger print, simpler language, and the like. 
However, the doctrine probably does not substantially constrain the major 
industry actors, who easily can obtain legislative redress in areas where 
questionable practices are important to their business models.90 
In the credit card context, the use of unconscionability as a tool to police 
contracting excesses also must overcome the widespread use of arbitration 
clauses in cardholder agreements.91 When courts enforce those provisions, 
they have no serious opportunity to assess the substantive provisions of 
credit card agreements or to consider whether issuers have complied with 
those provisions.92 Still, I doubt that judicial or regulatory invalidation of 
those provisions will have any substantial impact. For one thing, arbitration 
clauses might not contribute to business models that permit excessive card-
holder borrowing. Arbitration clauses are at most a detail in the history of 
the credit card industry. It is quite clear that most issuers did not use arbitra-
tion clauses in the United States until the late 1990s,93 and they are used 
rarely overseas. Yet the rise in borrowing—and attendant rise in consumer 
bankruptcy—that troubles policymakers was well on its way even before 
those clauses came into common use. To be sure, arbitration clauses proba-
bly deter at least some class actions. But, the class actions that would be 
available if the clauses were not enforced would only buttress the weak 
                                                                                                                      
 89. Jim White has an excellent discussion of the cases interpreting Section 211. James J. 
White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 315 (1997); see also Gillette, 
supra note 3, at 712–14. 
 90. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 952 (2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 7-5-4(c) (2004). 
 91. Attempts to invalidate arbitration clauses as unconscionable are hampered by the blunt-
ness of unconscionability, discussed above. The unconscionability doctrine works best with a 
limited set of problems. Thus, it might be able to respond to procedural defects with the provisions: 
lack of mutuality, inconvenient forum, high cost, and the like. See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. 
Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (relying on those kinds of defects to invalidate PayPal’s arbitration 
clause as unconscionable). Courts also arguably can grapple with arbitration clauses that limit sub-
stantive rights (i.e., shorten statutes of limitation, bar punitive damages or class actions, or shift 
attorney fees). See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Boehr, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). It is more difficult, 
though, for courts to address problems with the way arbitration works in practice under seemingly 
neutral arbitration provisions (i.e., concerns with secrecy, lack of accountability, and bias). See Jean 
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631 (2005). 
 92. Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789704 (arguing that functional judicial 
review of arbitration clauses would curtail unscrupulous behavior by card issuers by allowing the 
class action lawyer to be an agent for myopic consumers). 
 93. I rely here on the pleadings in Ross v. Bank of America. Class Action Complaint, Ross v. 
Bank of America, No. 05 CV 7116 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Class Action Com-
plaint]. 
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TILA disclosure regime discussed above94 and increase the ability of card-
holders to hold issuers to the terms of the agreements the issuers have 
drafted. Thus, for the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraph, they 
would have little effect on the substance of the relationship. 
This is not to say that there are not serious problems with arbitration 
clauses in credit card contracting. For example, there is at least some evi-
dence to support the view that issuers have colluded to adopt the clauses 
broadly because of concerns that customers care enough to shop for issuers 
that do not force arbitration.95 There also is some reason to think that the 
problems of bias have a serious effect in this industry, where the major issu-
ers have gravitated to a single provider (the National Arbitration Forum) that 
seems to be competing for business (at least in part) on a reputation for pro-
viding results that are satisfying to card issuers.96 
At bottom, the discussion in Part II suggests that arbitration clauses are 
not the result of competitive contracting. It is at least possible, however, that 
the cost savings of arbitration are sufficiently valuable that inclusion of the 
clauses is efficient.97 Moreover, arbitration proceedings probably could be 
constructed in a cost-effective and neutral way if the card networks were 
encouraged to intervene. Regardless of the outcome of that debate, it does 
not seem likely that prohibiting the use of arbitration provisions or regulat-
ing their content will solve the problem of excessive borrowing. 
2. Regulating Information 
If the existing regulatory regime is inadequate to inform consumers, 
even with the buttress of unconscionability doctrine to invalidate egregious 
excesses in contracting, the natural question is whether some other informa-
tion-based initiative could work. The goal would be to solve the borrowing 
problem that afflicts card markets without limiting the ability of market par-
ticipants to design and select products, through the provision of information 
                                                                                                                      
 94. Issuers might benefit by using arbitration offensively to avoid the ability of cardholders 
to raise defenses TILA grants them. For example, arbitrators might be more willing to enforce strict 
pleading deadlines, award attorney fees, and the like. Because so much of the collection litigation 
revolves around unauthorized use defenses, truncated procedures might dispose of those claims 
more expeditiously than litigation. 
 95. This is the core allegation, as yet unproven, in Ross v. Bank of America. Class Action 
Complaint, supra note 87.  
 96. Id. Again, this has been alleged, not proven. 
 97. Arbitration clauses arguably are no worse in the credit card industry than they are in the 
many other contexts in which they are common. To be sure, it is easy to think of some contexts in 
which it is hard to object to truncated remedies—the terms on which McDonald’s offers prizes to its 
customers, for example. The aggregate effect of credit card borrowing makes it hard to put credit 
card agreements in that category. Yet, I doubt that credit card transactions are uniquely ill suited to 
resolution by arbitration. See James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis. L. 
Rev. 723, 742 (“For a nickel or a dime, almost all of us would . . . agree to arbitrate.”); cf. Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (“[I]t stands to reason that passengers who 
purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of re-
duced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be 
sued.”). 
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that might “debias” consumers and thus overcome the cognitive defects em-
phasized in Part II of this essay. This is a specific example of the approach 
of using information to warn consumers about systematic cognitive errors. 
Gabaix and Laibson, for example, talk of required “warning labels” like 
those we see on cigarettes.98 As applied to this context, the basic idea is that 
warnings of some sort might limit improvident and impulsive spending. 
One approach would rely on information campaigns designed to respond 
to the availability-heuristic, making consumers more cognizant of the effects 
of excessive borrowing by telling consumers about them.99 Yet the parallel to 
smoking campaigns illustrates how difficult such a campaign would be. It 
has taken decades of concerted effort at all levels of the government to bring 
the growth of smoking among young people to something of a standstill—
this for a product without redeeming social value, plainly addictive and as-
sociated with the most catastrophic health consequences. Consumer 
expenditure and credit, on the other hand, are more ambiguous in their ef-
fects on our economy: we can hardly expect the government to urge 
consumers not to spend.100 In addition, we certainly cannot expect the gov-
ernment to ban advertisements urging consumers to spend as we have 
banned most cigarette advertising. Finally, as Juliet Schor shows so well, 
discretionary consumer spending is such an integral part of U.S. culture that 
it would be even harder to eradicate it than it has been to slow the growth of 
smoking.101 Collectively, those concerns make investment in information 
campaigns a poor option. 
Another possibility—the focus of existing statutory responses like 
TILA—is additional disclosures at the time of contracting. Yet there is little 
reason to think that government-drafted summaries of the terms on which 
issuers do not compete will make those terms any more important to con-
sumers than they currently are. If, as Part II suggests, consumers choose a 
credit card based on a small group of salient characteristics on which card 
issuers compete, then disclosures at the point of agreement will do little to 
alter consumer decisionmaking. 
That is not to say that nothing can be done to improve consumer deci-
sionmaking. For example, if the point of contracting is not a salient point in 
the psyche of the consumer, a regime altering the information available at 
the points of purchase or repayment could be productive.102 I also think it is 
plausible that policymakers could reduce impulsive consumption by efforts 
to foster greater segmentation of payment systems (so that fewer people are 
using a credit card for everyday purchasing transactions) and by removing 
                                                                                                                      
 98. See Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 57, at 24. 
 99. See Sunstein, supra note 5 (recommending a campaign that would disseminate “vivid 
narratives of possible harm”). 
 100. See Cohen, supra note 73 (discussing longstanding federal campaign to foster consumer 
spending to resuscitate the American economy after World War II). 
 101. See Juliet B. Schor, The Overspent American (1998). 
 102. I discuss such a regime in Mann, supra note 2, ch. 13. 
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and reducing the current monetary incentives to use credit cards.103 For pre-
sent purposes, however, the relevant point is that I see no cost-effective way 
to use information-based responses to improve the rationality of cardholder 
behavior at the point of contracting. 
B. Moving Forward 
I turn now to the possibilities of direct regulation of the terms of credit 
card agreements. Here, I consider two approaches: prohibiting unpriceable 
terms and promulgating agreements that provide a standard contractual tem-
plate for the relationship. 
1. Prohibit Specific Terms Ex Ante 
The first solution would be to prohibit the use of certain terms. That ap-
proach is common in other jurisdictions. Consider, for example, the 
European Union’s Unfair Terms Directive,104 which generally prohibits the 
inclusion of certain types of unfair terms in consumer contracts unless they 
are the result of individual negotiation.105 By U.S. standards, the list is intru-
sive, prohibiting, among other things, unilateral modification clauses and 
arbitration clauses.106 
Such a broad regime might seem almost unthinkable to U.S. businesses. 
Yet it is not that different from the regulatory approach in other consumer 
financial transactions in which a small number of important issues dominate 
the forms. For example, consider the residential lease contract, in which the 
most important term for consumer protection purposes is likely to be a war-
ranty of habitability. After a period during which courts struggled with 
lessor efforts to waive such a warranty, it is in many jurisdictions now set-
tled by statute or regulation that the lessor of a residence provides such a 
warranty.107 Similarly, in the home mortgage context, it is now quite un-
common to see a provision providing for mandatory arbitration.108 
                                                                                                                      
 103. See id. chs. 11, 14.  
 104. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.  
 105. As Larry Bates has shown, several other countries have developed administrative ap-
proaches under which bureaucrats generally approve form contracts. See Larry Bates, 
Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of Consumer Pro-
tection, 16 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1 (2002). For example, consider Israel’s Standard Contract Law of 
1964, which allows users of form contracts to obtain government approval of “restrictive terms.” 
Approval immunizes the terms from court challenge for five years. Standard Contracts Law, 5724-
1964, 18 LSI 51 (1963–64) (Isr.). 
 106. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, Annex, 1993 
O.J. (L 95) 33 ¶¶ 1(j), 1(q). 
 107. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 92.006, 92.052 (Vernon 1995) (establishing a non-
waivable warranty of habitability); Slawson, supra note 12, at 49–50. 
 108. The most obvious reason is that the Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA” or 
“Fannie Mae”) will not purchase a mortgage that includes such a provision. E.g., Fannie Mae, 
Announcement 04-06, at 4–5 (2004), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2004/ 
fannie-04-06.pdf.  
MANN FINAL.DOC 2/17/2006 8:42 AM 
March 2006] “Contracting” for Credit 923 
 
In this context, there are price terms that consumers might assess more 
rationally if the contracting process were improved. Provisions that permit 
retroactive price adjustments interfere with the ability of consumers to as-
sess the risks of default and nonpayment, because they allow price 
adjustments that come into effect after the time of the purchasing decision to 
which they apply.109 I call those “unpriceable” terms, not because consumers 
can never evaluate them, but because few consumers can be expected to 
evaluate their significance accurately.110 That impulse would follow naturally 
from the idea that it is appropriate to ban terms whenever it is likely that all 
or almost all consumers will not be able to respond accurately to the 
terms.111 
Thus, for example, regulators could ban unilateral amendments that ap-
ply to prior transactions without allowing consumers a feasible opportunity 
to opt out. The fifteen-day notice requirement mandated by Regulation Z112 
gives consumers little time to find alternate credit sources. Depending on the 
requirements of the particular opt-out provision, the absence of another 
credit source might make compliance with opt-out requirements impractical. 
For example, a provision stating that the consumer must repay the entire 
balance immediately will not provide a realistic option to a liquidity-
constrained customer. 
One possible response that might enhance consumer decisionmaking 
without significantly restricting the drafting practices of issuers would be to 
lengthen notice requirements so that consumers would have additional time 
to find alternate credit sources. Going farther, regulators could explore ways 
to improve the readability and presentation of change-in-terms notices, 
broaden consumer opt-out rights, or even ban post hoc application of unilat-
eral amendments entirely. 
A similar example is the “universal default” provisions that are the focus 
of current regulatory initiatives. Essentially, universal default terms in credit 
card agreements permit an issuer to raise the rate it charges one of its bor-
rowers substantially if that borrower commits a default on an unrelated debt 
to a different lender, even if the borrower has not missed a payment to the 
credit card issuer in question. It is one thing for an issuer to stop (or raise 
the rate on) new extensions of credit based on adverse credit information—
we expect (and hope) that issuers will do that routinely. It is quite another, 
                                                                                                                      
 109. As I discuss in Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, one might 
think that this problem poses an objection to the entirety of the consumer bankruptcy provisions in 
the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Ronald J. Mann, Optimizing Con-
sumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy, 7 J. Theoretical Inquiries in L. (forthcoming 
2006). 
 110. Todd Rakoff refers more elegantly to “invisible” terms—terms the consumer does not 
notice. See Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1250–55. I have in mind here a narrower category—terms that 
not only are invisible in practice, but that are impossible for a consumer to assess because they 
operate ex post facto. 
 111. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 33, at 1456–59; see also Camerer et al., supra note 
85. 
 112. Truth in Lending Act, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) (2005). 
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however, for creditors to increase the interest rate on debts already incurred, 
solely because of a late payment to a different creditor. Regulators, upset by 
the application of universal default provisions, have responded by insisting 
that credit card issuers provide better disclosure of the provisions in their 
agreements with customers.113 
The discussion above suggests that a disclosure regime is not the appro-
priate response. For one thing, it rests on the premise that consumers that 
receive the disclosures will alter their behavior, which is improbable for the 
reasons emphasized above. More fundamentally, an emphasis on disclosure 
misses the point. My sense is that the underlying complaint of consumers is 
that the provisions are fundamentally unfair: “We shouldn’t have to pay 
more to Bank One simply because we were late on a payment to Providian.” 
Policymakers for the most part have retreated to a disclosure-based response 
because of their unwillingness to press that fairness argument.114 
In my view, the discussion above shows how the fairness argument con-
ceals a powerful economic argument for barring universal default 
provisions. Universal default rules are one of the attributes consumers are 
least likely to “price” in their contracting and product-selection decisions. 
This is true because they are a “boilerplate” attribute that will not be of great 
significance for most consumers selecting products. It also is true because 
the cost of the provision is quite difficult to assess up front (depending, as it 
does, on the interaction between future defaults by the borrower to other 
lenders and the other lenders’ reactions to those defaults). It is difficult when 
I make a purchase today to factor in the likelihood that the interest rate on 
that purchase at some distant time in the future will increase by some un-
specified amount because of a default I make in a payment to some other 
creditor. If an omnicompetent consumer could not take account of the rate 
differentiation, then the differentiation is not effectively altering borrowing 
behavior. Because consumers are not pricing this term, there is no reason to 
rely on its existence in contracts as evidence of its optimality. 
The absence of contracting competition does not prove, however, that 
the term is not optimal. It is possible that the provisions operate to shift the 
net burden of charges by credit card issuers to some extent toward the most 
distressed borrowers, the ones most likely to default, and away from those 
least likely to default. The increased collections from those customers might 
support lower charges for “convenience” users that do not borrow or default. 
Thus, it is at least possible that a rational and fully informed cardholder 
would think the benefits of such a clause exceed its costs.115  
                                                                                                                      
 113. See Linda Punch, Getting Tough?, Credit Card Mgmt., Feb. 2005, at 42, 43–44 (dis-
cussing proposals made by the Comptroller of the Currency). 
 114. There is, however, a bill pending that would ban these provisions entirely, by prohibiting 
any alteration of interest rates “for reasons other than actions or omissions of the consumer that are 
directly related to [the consumer’s credit card] account.” Consumer Credit Card Protection Act of 
2005, H.R. 3492, 109th Cong., § 2 (2005). 
 115. I discount the possibility that the clause provides signaling benefits by sorting customers 
that do not expect to default (who would not be concerned about such a clause) from those that do 
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More broadly, universal default provisions are part of the developments 
in the credit card market that have fostered segmentation, which has led in 
turn to a marked differentiation of rates among cardholders with different 
risk profiles.116 As a general matter, that trend is positive, because it permits 
more accurate pricing. The role of universal default terms in that market 
segmentation depends on the odd ramifications of “default” in the credit 
card market. In conventional commercial markets, an act of default by a 
borrower is a data point that indicates to the lender that the transaction has 
become riskier than previously anticipated and thus more likely to produce a 
loss. Typically, lenders respond proactively by managing the transaction in a 
way that responds to the increased risk of loss.117  In the credit card context, 
however, an event of default (such as a late payment to another creditor or 
even a late payment to the card issuer) is a signal that the cardholder is fi-
nancially constrained. To the issuer, such an occurrence is a signal of two 
cardholder attributes that collectively make the cardholder a profit center for 
the issuer. First, the cardholder is likely to borrow more in the immediately 
ensuing months. Second, the cardholder’s switching costs have increased 
because of the difficulty the cardholder will face in repaying the entire out-
standing balance in a time of financial distress. Thus, the issuer can respond 
by substantially increasing the fees charged to the cardholder with a dimin-
ished concern that the cardholder will shift the borrowing to a different 
lender. Indeed, one might imagine that a cardholder’s anticipated value as a 
customer rises almost to the point of a bankruptcy filing. 
The issue, then, is whether it matters that cardholders in fact do not un-
derstand the clauses (or their consequences) when they enter the 
agreements. Should we prevent this choice on that basis? If we think of this 
as tantamount to a unilateral alteration of terms after the fact, we might be 
inclined to ban such clauses. On the other hand, if we want to protect the 
ability of convenience users to choose a card that might be cheaper for them 
because of the increased revenues issuers receive when they exercise unilat-
eral default provisions, we might want to allow them. 
An intermediate approach, parallel to the analysis of opt-out clauses 
above, would focus on providing cardholders a practical opportunity to re-
spond before adverse action. For example, regulators might forbid issuers to 
raise interest rates based on application of a universal default clause without 
providing cardholders a substantial notice period, coupled with an opportu-
nity to challenge the relevant information and an opportunity to shift their 
outstanding debt to a different issuer. 
For me, in the end, the most sensible approach is to ban the clauses en-
tirely. I am driven primarily by my view that convenience users as a class 
                                                                                                                      
expect to default (who would be concerned). Tolerance of a clause that goes unread can send no 
signal. 
 116. See Mark Furletti, Payment Cards Ctr., Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Credit Card 
Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure (2003). 
 117. See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 Mich. L. 
Rev. 159 (1997). 
MANN FINAL.DOC 2/17/2006 8:42 AM 
926 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:899 
 
should be shifted to debit cards and newer payment systems.118 I recognize 
that one likely effect of such a rule would be more extensive and detailed 
default clauses, focusing on events internal to the cardholder-issuer relation-
ship.119 That seems positive, at least in part because of the likelihood that it 
would lessen reliance on external sources of information (with questionable 
reliability) such as credit reports. Moreover, it might be that cardholders 
eventually could come to understand and react to those terms. 
Another likely effect would be a contraction of credit (or increase in 
price) to the affected borrowers. Again, that response would be beneficial if 
financial distress by cardholders imposes costs on society and if current 
business models encourage borrowers to wait too long before filing for 
bankruptcy. A system that induces issuers to terminate lending earlier might 
lower the social costs of financial distress by pressing risky borrowers into 
an earlier resolution of their financial affairs. 
* * * * * 
This discussion is not intended to suggest that universal default provi-
sions are the only—or even the most important—provisions in credit card 
agreements that do not advance the social value of the relationship. Rather, 
within the brief scope of this essay, the discussion is intended to be exem-
plary, to illustrate the kinds of provisions that such an approach would ban. 
Presumably, the most sensible way to implement such an approach 
would be for a relatively well-informed regulator (such as the Federal Re-
serve or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”),120 or, less 
plausibly in our current environment, the Federal Trade Commission) to 
engage in a cooperative examination, with participation by the affected par-
ties, of the relevant terms. The point here is that a regulator that bans a 
particular term that commonly is part of the product is likely to affect the 
market for the product in some cognizable way—by either increasing the 
cost or lowering the amount or quality of the product in some way.121 The 
                                                                                                                      
 118. I discuss that view in more detail in Mann, supra note 2, pt. IV. 
 119. Of course, in some sense all clauses that define events of default operate to alter the 
terms of the relationship after the fact: whenever a borrower fails to make a payment in a timely 
manner, the lender is likely to have the right to increase the interest rate that applies to debt that is 
outstanding at that time. Universal default clauses are more problematic than the standard clauses, 
however, because they extend the definition of default to include events outside the relationship. My 
point is not that a creditor reacts irrationally (or unfairly) in concluding that cardholders that are in 
default to other creditors are more risky than those that are not in default to any creditor. Rather, the 
concern is that most cardholders, most of the time, will not accurately account for this in ordering 
their financial affairs. Moreover, few if any of them will price it accurately when they enter into 
their cardholder agreements. To that extent, the actual effect of the clause is quite different from the 
typical default clause, which in consumer lending agreements focuses almost entirely on a failure to 
make timely payment to the creditor. 
 120. National banks dominate the major card issuers, because only national banks are entitled 
to the preemptive provisions of the National Bank Act. Because the OCC regulates all national 
banks, the OCC would be in a position to regulate major credit card issuers if it chose to do so. See 
Furletti, supra note 77. To date, however, the OCC for the most part has limited itself to safety and 
soundness regulation—criticizing practices that might undermine the solvency of the institution 
(such as unduly risky lending practices). 
 121. See White & Mansfield, supra note 16, at 258–59. 
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justification for regulation is the idea that contracting is inherently lawmak-
ing,122 and that standardized adhesion contracts in practice operate as 
“unilateral codes,” by which the parties that promulgate them “usurp the 
law-making function,” effectively providing “government by private law.”123 
The idea is not a new one. Indeed, it is at least as old as the work of Ar-
thur Leff, who viewed defective contracts as analogous to defective 
automobiles.124 As he explains, the decision a regulator should be making 
when it makes such a decision is that consumers are better off with the 
higher price (or lower quantity or quality) of the product that comes in a 
market without the choice to accept the prohibited term.125 Thus, the discus-
sion above suggests banning universal default terms based on the idea that 
the most likely effect would be a contraction of credit in a market that is 
both functioning quite poorly and also generating substantial externalities. 
The analysis is comparable to the decision of the Department of Transporta-
tion to require all cars to have airbags—some of us would buy cars without 
airbags, but the government has determined that we all are better off if we 
cannot make that choice. 
There are obvious problems with such an approach.126 Among other 
things, it is not clear that regulators will do a better job than courts in identi-
fying terms to be invalidated. Still, there is at least some reason to believe 
that an ex ante approach—that can be applied evenly across contracts and be 
incorporated into the price—is preferable, because of the likelihood that the 
opportunity for input from affected businesses will lead regulators to avoid 
(or quickly repair) truly egregious errors. 
2. Standardized Terms 
Term invalidation is probably an incomplete response. Another response 
would be to standardize card agreements.127 At first glance, that approach 
seems more intrusive, because it abandons reliance on the market to develop 
the optimal terms. The use of pre-approved terms, however, is the conven-
tional approach for remedying contracting problems in other consumer 
finance markets. Indeed, credit card agreements stand out as one of the rare 
types of consumer financial transactions that do not proceed on some set of 
pre-approved terms.128 Home mortgages are executed almost entirely on the 
                                                                                                                      
 122. See Slawson, supra note 6, at 530. 
 123. See Schuchman, supra note 53, at 130. 
 124. See Leff, supra note 7, at 144–55. 
 125. Jean Braucher argues that the Federal Trade Commission has been doing something 
much like this, and that it did it reasonably well, at least during the 1980s. See Jean Braucher, Defin-
ing Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 
349 (1988). 
 126. See Gillette, supra note 3, at 717–19; Leff, supra note 7, at 152. 
 127. Jeffrey Davis made a similar proposal two decades ago. See Jeffrey Davis, Revamping 
Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1333 (1982). 
 128. The phenomenon is not new. For early discussion, see Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing 
of Contracts, 27 Yale L.J. 34, 37–40 (1917); Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1182. 
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standard FNMA form. A glance at the form would convince most of us 
that—although it suffers from many of the readability problems discussed in 
Part I—it is not a form drafted to exploit consumer myopia or cognitive 
weakness.129 Similarly, state regulators largely determine the major terms of 
insurance policies.130 Major real estate transactions—such as the sale of a 
home—typically proceed on forms that are standardized by a government 
agency131 or some intermediary that at least in part represents the interests of 
consumers.
132
 
Presumably, a standard account agreement would include mandatory 
provisions for the legal aspects of the relationship, with specific options on 
issues where there are substantial business reasons for product differentia-
tion. Thus, we might expect two or three variations on the method for 
calculating the outstanding balance—one without any grace period, one 
with a full grace period, and a moderate provision in between. There also 
would be options for the financial terms on which issuers compete, includ-
ing the interest rate and the amount of annual, late, and overlimit fees. 
Such a proposal would respond directly to the problem of multiplicity of 
terms and agreements summarized above. Thus, like the FTC Mail-Order 
Rule, it would funnel competition among card issuers directly into the at-
tributes for which variation is permitted, predominantly price-related 
attributes as to which consumer understanding is heightened and for which 
competition is easier to imagine. 
To be sure, this solution would do little to decrease complexity. Yet the 
relationship necessarily is a complex one. Even if standardization substan-
tially lowered the number of terms that a typical cardholder would need to 
understand, it is doubtful that it would simplify the relationship sufficiently 
to make a fully competitive cardholder reaction a realistic possibility. The 
number of attributes of relevance to a fair assessment of a modern credit 
card product, even putting the agreement aside, is sufficiently large as to 
make it implausible to think that most cardholders can aggregate and assess 
the attributes rationally.133 
                                                                                                                      
 129. It is not the point of this essay to argue that those markets function well or that cognitive 
problems do not contribute to excessive borrowing in those markets. I do think, however, that much 
of the recent controversy in these markets focuses on home equity products, which are less standard-
ized than the first-lien home mortgage markets I discuss in the text. In my view, the greatest cause of 
excessive borrowing in the first-lien home mortgage market is likely to be federal intervention (in 
the form of loan guarantee programs) that encourages homeowners to borrow funds that private 
lenders would not lend. 
 130. See Abraham, supra note 40, at 32–33; Macaulay, supra note 7, at 1062; Slawson, supra 
note 12, at 50–52. 
 131. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 5 (Vernon 2003) (articulating various provisions and 
notices that must be used in residential real estate transactions). 
 132. In many geographic areas, a residential real estate transaction proceeds on a form pre-
pared by a group of real estate brokers. That group might not be biased in favor of consumers—their 
primary interest doubtless is to prod the transaction toward consummation (so that a brokerage 
commission is due)—but that interest typically results in a reasonably balanced form. 
 133. See Grether et al., supra note 49, at 296–97. 
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Still, standardization should over time advance cardholder understand-
ing considerably. I think, for example, of the typical apartment lease, a 
document of comparable complexity, read directly by few consumers. How-
ever, most of us have a reasonable understanding of the typical aspects of 
that business relationship, predominantly because the terms are relatively 
standardized and stable over time. If the terms of credit cardholder agree-
ments were uniform, we would expect that through experience many 
cardholders would come to understand the basic terms that define the events 
that lead to late payments, overlimit fees, events of default, and the like. 
Given the ways in which multiplicity of terms and term cycling exacerbate 
the role of complexity in the existing market, there is good reason to think 
that standardization would be helpful. 
Further, the oft-cited objections to using mandatory terms are less com-
pelling in this context. The first is the one discussed above, that 
standardization will narrow the range of product attributes that issuers can 
use to attract and satisfy customers. As suggested in the previous section, 
standardization decreases consumer welfare to the extent that it drives at-
tractive products out of the market.134 In this context, however, firms do not 
currently compete to attract customers based on the non-price terms of these 
agreements. Indeed, the root of the problem is that there are terms that have 
a substantial economic effect that are ignored. A regime that eliminates dif-
ferentiation on those terms would not make the products less attractive to 
most customers. The dominant effect would be a long-term one, in which 
customers eventually might come to understand those terms sufficiently to 
consider them in assessing the risks and appropriate pricing of their pur-
chasing and borrowing behavior. To the extent that opportunities for 
delivering products to particular classes of cardholders are limited, I expect 
that the benefits to the cardholders in the mainstream would far exceed the 
harms.135 
A more difficult problem is the likelihood that regulators will draft the 
terms less capably than card issuers will. The terms will be more obscure, 
will not improve over time, will include more unintentional ambiguities, or 
will not produce the optimal allocations of risks among the parties. In many 
contexts, such concerns would be serious, and the record of obscure drafting 
of disclosures by the Federal Reserve should give us pause before seeking 
uniform governmental drafting. In this case, however, against the back-
ground of existing contract practices, the problems might be less troubling. 
For one thing, the discussion above suggests little reason to think that exist-
ing terms are drafted with care to be clear and unambiguous or to create an 
optimal allocation of risks. Rather, the market currently seems to drive com-
petitive issuers to obscure their terms to escape the notice of their 
                                                                                                                      
 134. See id. at 298–99. 
 135. See Camerer et al., supra note 85. The most obvious potential harm to consumers would 
be a contraction of the credit markets in response to limitations on ex post facto terms. My analysis 
here assumes that the likely contraction will affect for the most part consumers that are already in 
serious financial distress. To the extent lenders stop or limit credit to those people sooner, contrac-
tion in fact is likely to be desirable. Mann, supra note 2, ch. 17. 
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customers. Moreover, as long as the terms are standardized and within some 
broad range of reasonableness, differences in their impact can be treated by 
alterations in the price terms that would be left to card issuer discretion 
(grace periods, interest rates, amounts of the various fees, and the like). 
Still, the problems of government drafting suggest an alternate approach 
that might be useful: pressure from federal regulators on the networks to 
promulgate uniform terms. Many of the examples to which I refer at the 
beginning of this Section do not involve direct government regulation. 
Rather, they involve drafting by intermediaries in a framework that moti-
vates the intermediaries to consider the interests of consumers.  
In this context, the obvious candidates for standardized drafting would 
be Visa and MasterCard. If Visa and MasterCard could be motivated to per-
ceive that the issuance of uniform (and stable) terms on a network-by-
network basis was a prudent course to avoid federal intervention and gov-
ernment standardization, we might reach the best of all possible outcomes: a 
well-drafted and sophisticated allocation of risks, with sufficient stability 
that customers could adapt to it. For example, if networks were motivated to 
allocate risks efficiently, they might include a low-cost dispute resolution 
process like the one used for consumer-merchant disputes governed by 
TILA. As Andy Morriss and Jason Korosec illustrate, a side effect of the 
provisions of TILA shifting the costs of dispute resolution to card issuers 
has been the creation of a highly efficient and technology-driven system for 
resolving claims of inappropriate charges.136 A system in which an individual 
network committed that its issuers could be held to the terms of their 
agreements at least theoretically could be a powerful marketplace tool. 
Imagine, for example, if MasterCard advertised that consumers who are 
troubled by “unfair late fees” and “unresponsive card issuers” should use 
their MasterCard, knowing that they could rely on MasterCard’s consumer 
protection guarantee. 
At first glance, it might seem difficult to motivate Visa and MasterCard 
to implement such a scheme. The history of federal regulation of payment 
intermediaries, however, suggests a more optimistic perspective. For exam-
ple, Stewart Macaulay shows how bitterly card issuers opposed the 
provisions of TILA that make them responsible for unauthorized use.137 To-
day, however, the leading card networks advertise their willingness to accept 
responsibility for unauthorized use even more broadly than TILA requires. 
Similarly, banks strongly opposed the Expedited Funds Availability Act, but 
now offer funds availability schedules far more generous than that statute 
requires.138 More generally, a familiar pattern of policy development on the 
                                                                                                                      
 136. Andrew P. Morriss & Jason Korosec, Private Dispute Resolution in the Card Context: 
Structure, Reputation, and Incentives (Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 
No. 05-12, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=735283. 
 137. See Macaulay, supra note 7. 
 138. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions 23–
29 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001–4010 
(West 2005)). 
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Internet has involved extensive initiatives by private intermediaries acting in 
the shadow of threatened regulation.139 Thus, just as eBay and the card net-
works have been persuaded by state regulators to limit their involvement in 
activities in ways existing law probably does not require, there is some rea-
son to think that regulatory authorities could persuade Visa and MasterCard 
that voluntary “Fair Contracting” initiatives might be a prudent course to 
forestall formal regulatory intervention. 
Finally, a still narrower solution might avoid the risks of centralized 
drafting, but still force the production of terms in a way that makes them 
amenable to evaluation by intermediaries. There is some reason to think that 
public scrutiny of the terms of cardholder agreements is more effective than 
person-by-person negotiation with cardholders. For example, a review of 
cardholder agreements used by major issuers indicates that the flurry of 
public attention to universal default terms (discussed below) has led at least 
one major issuer to agree to provide advance notice before declaring univer-
sal default.140 The current public attention led to standardization of the time 
by which consumers must send payments to avoid late fees—a bright-line 
rule, for example, that lenders must treat payments received by mail at 3 
p.m. or 5 p.m. as made on the date of actual receipt.141 
The Internet makes broad dissemination of standard terms easier than it 
would have been when TILA was enacted. Thus, credit card issuers could be 
required to post the major nonprice terms of their agreements in a uniform 
format on either their own sites or publicly available Internet sites (such as a 
site hosted by the FTC, the Federal Reserve, or the OCC).142 The simplest 
approach probably would be to post them on the FTC’s user-friendly web-
site, so that intermediaries reliably could find all of the terms in a single 
place. Issuers that wished to do so also of course could post their terms on 
their own sites. Indeed, if the FTC required issuers to provide a URL for an 
address at which the issuer had posted the terms, it would not matter where 
the terms technically were posted, because the FTC site could provide a 
catalog of links to the individual postings. The benefit of requiring the terms 
to be posted directly at the FTC, however, is that it would facilitate 
downloading the terms in a readily analyzable format such as a spreadsheet. 
                                                                                                                      
 139. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 239 (2005). 
 140. See Universal Default, Cardflash: Daily Payment Card News, May 18, 2005, at 2, 
http://cardweb.com/cardflash (discussing change in Citibank policy). I find it most unlikely that all 
(or even most) issuers will remove these clauses. In the current environment, in which cardholder 
agreements—even those used by publicly traded regulated financial institutions—are not available 
online, it is difficult to collect specific information on that point.  
 141. See id. at 1 (discussing Federal Reserve consideration of such a proposal). Any reader 
that thinks it is impractical for mail to be processed as quickly as that proposal suggests should 
become familiar with Netflix’s mail processing routines. See Netflix.com, How It Works, 
http://www.netflix.com/HowItWorks?lnkctr=nmhhiw (last visited Jan. 7, 2006). 
 142. See Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A 
Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 05-012, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686817 (making similar 
proposal for electronic contracts).  
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Regulators also could require that any set of terms remain in effect for a 
certain minimum period (such as 90 days) to facilitate the activity of inter-
mediaries that might examine the postings and provide public assessments 
of the various terms. In the current environment, terms are not publicly 
available, so consumers do not see them until they have responded posi-
tively to a solicitation and received a card, at which point their credit rating 
already reflects the extension of credit. Initiatives to educate consumers 
about the meaning of unpriceable terms or to persuade responsible issuers to 
avoid unpriceable terms can have a positive effect only if it is possible for 
consumers to pick among issuers based on the terms. Public disclosure of 
the terms is perhaps the simplest way to jump-start such a regime. 
Conclusion 
Compared to other consumer financial contracts, credit card agreements 
are not subject to significant regulatory constraints. Yet, credit card contracts 
arguably are the most perilous for consumers, because credit cards are asso-
ciated with increased consumer spending and financial distress. The risk is 
exacerbated by the ability and incentives of sophisticated card issuers, ad-
mittedly driven by the business necessities of a continuing credit 
relationship, to exploit cardholder relationships. Thus, the realities of credit 
card transactions produce a set of dynamic contracting obligations that even 
sophisticated cardholders cannot master.  
I argue that the juxtaposition of financial peril, market dysfunction, and 
lack of regulation should not continue. Thus, I propose the prospective in-
validation of terms in cardholder agreements that apply to debts incurred in 
connection with previous transactions. A more effective response, however, 
would parallel the approach that already exists in most other substantial 
consumer financial transactions—a regulatory (or self-regulatory) standardi-
zation of cardholder agreements.  
